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RFRA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE
Frederick Mark Gedicks"
I was skeptical when I first heard of the effort to overrule
Employment Division v. Smith statutorily with the proposal of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.1 Why work so hard to
restore a test that had never made all that much difference? I
was eventually convinced by the arguments of litigators in this
area that the compelling interest test made a difference at the
administrative and trial level, where many religious exemption
cases are decided, even if the test was largely ineffective in ap-
pellate litigation. The significant number of reported cases in the
interval between Smith and RFRA which denied religious ex-
emptions for relatively unimportant reasons suggests that the
test had indeed created some space for religious exercise-space
that was eliminated by Smith and (one hopes) restored by RFRA.
I also concluded that, as a matter of faith, Mormon beliefs and
the particular experience of Mormons with religious persecution
in the United States suggested that Mormons ought to support
RFRA so long as there exists the possibility that it will enhance
freedom for religious minorities.2
Still, much of my skepticism remains. In addition to the
potential problems that RFRA presents under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment,3 it seems fair to consider why there is
such a push to re-install the doctrinal regime that brought us
Lee, Goldman, and Lyng, to name a few of the low points in the
Supreme Court's dubious pre-Smith interpretations of the Free
Exercise Clause.4 Indeed, in Smith itself Justice O'Connor would
t Copyright © 1995, Montana Law Review; Frederick Mark Gedicks.
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. I wish to thank John Kelleher
for excellent research assistance in the preparation of this paper. Parts I and III of
this paper are adapted from a chapter of my forthcoming book, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE, to be published by Duke University Press in the fall of 1995.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
2. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to
Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAuL L. REV. 167 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Con-
stitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995).
4. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (Free Exercise Clause does not prevent federal government from implementing
land use plan that would destroy native American religion); Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying orthodox Jewish serviceman exemption from uniform
regulation which prevented his wearing a yarmulke); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982) (denying Amish employer exemption from payment of social security tax-
es).
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have relied on the compelling state interest test to deny the reli-
gious claimants relief.5 To my friend Chip Lupu, I say that he
ought not worry about broad interpretations of RFRAs because
the early indications are that the well-practiced techniques of
narrow construction and crabbed application that gutted the
compelling interest test the first time around are still very much
with us.7
Even if RFRA does not wholly fail as law, I believe that it
will enjoy only modest success. Although there are bound to be
more victories for religious minorities under RFRA than under
Smith, there does not seem to be any greater reason now than
before Smith to think that courts will interpret and apply the
compelling interest test under RFRA more charitably than they
applied the old Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.8 I will begin by briefly
explaining why I believe this is so.' Following that, I will spend
some time dealing with a more complicated and interesting ques-
tion: Assuming that RFRA has limited influence as law, might it
not be more successful in some other way, as something else? I
will explore this question first by relating some insights of the
French philosopher Jacques Derrida into the tension between
law and justice," and then by applying these insights to RFRA
and religious liberty.11
I.
When Smith was handed down late in the 1989 Term, it was
immediately and widely criticized. 2 The vehemence of the criti-
cism suggested that the Supreme Court had abandoned a doc-
trine deeply embedded in the American constitutional tradition.
The historical record suggests the opposite. Although the idea of
5. See 494 U.S. 872, 905-06 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171 (1995).
7. See, e.g., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 152
B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (finding that contributions to church are "avoidable"
under Bankruptcy Code did not violate RFRA's compelling interest test).
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See, e.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 91, 94-99 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 2-3; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 233-34 (1991).
[Vol. 56
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judges' exempting religious believers from the burdens of gener-
ally applicable law was not unknown in the founding era,13 cas-
es reporting such exemptions are rare. The Mormon Polygamy
Cases4 are the most notorious example of judicial hostility to
religious exemptions, but they are not aberrations. In the 1960s,
Marc Galanter reported that he had been able to find only one
decision before 1940 in which a claim of religious liberty was
accepted as a defense to criminal liability."' At the Supreme
Court's level, judicial hostility to exemptions was evident as late
as 1961 in Braunfeld v. Brown, when the Court denied an ortho-
dox Jewish businessman's claim that a Sunday closing law put
him at a competitive disadvantage and threatened the economic
viability of his business. 6 The Court refused to grant him an
exemption from the law because doing so might have under-
mined the law's purpose of providing a uniform day of rest, re-
laxation, and family togetherness. 7 This was, to be sure, a le-
gitimate legislative goal, but hardly a compelling one, especially
since other jurisdictions had provided such an exemption without
suffering any of the problems the Court had imagined."s
The difficulty for religious freedom under an exemption
regime like that of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine reinstated by
RFRA is that the norm of liberal neutrality that informs the
Court's interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause does not have
the theoretical resources to justify relieving burdens on religious
practice caused by government action that is fully justified on
secular grounds. Liberal neutrality requires that government
remain aloof from the private choices of individuals, intervening
only to protect classical conceptions of life, liberty, and proper-
ty.'9 Liberal neutrality recognizes religion only to the extent
that it can be understood through the categories of individuality
and secularity. ° It thus permits religion to manifest itself in
13. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1511-12 (1990).
14. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey,
114 U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Marc Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 234.
16. 366 U.S. 599, 601-02 (1961).
17. Id. at 607-09.
18. See id. at 614-15 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 66 (1987);
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 73, 89 (2d ed. 1984); Joel F. Handler,
Dependent People, the State and the Modern IPostmodern Search for the Dialogic
Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999, 1060-61 (1988).
20. Cf PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962) (arguing that reli-
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public life only as the effect of private, individual choice. For
example, government can maintain a position of neutrality with
respect to, and thus avoid constitutional responsibility for, finan-
cial aid to religion so long as the aid is funnelled to individuals
pursuant to broad, secularly defined beneficiary categories.2
Under these circumstances, the government has not distorted the
"natural" pattern of private choice by creating a special benefit
available only to religious institutions. The fact that some, or
even most, of such aid ultimately ends up in the coffers of reli-
gious institutions is not chargeable to the government because
the decision to spend the aid to benefit religion is made by the
individual recipient and not the government itself.22
This private choice analysis has permitted the Court to up-
hold against Establishment Clause challenges a variety of gov-
ernment actions which assist religion." But the same analysis
that permits aid to religion under the Establishment Clause cuts
in a different direction under the Free Exercise Clause. To ex-
cuse religious individuals from compliance with generally appli-
cable law, solely because of religious belief, distorts the pattern
of private religious choice by creating a benefit available only to
believers. 4 Put another way, if the Establishment Clause does
not require that religious individuals be uniquely deprived of
gion should not be used as a basis for government classifications); William P. Mar-
shall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MiNN. L.
REV. 545 (1983) (arguing that religious expression should receive constitutional pro-
tection under the Free Exercise Clause only if analogous secular expression would be
protected by the Free Speech Clause).
21. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
482-83, 487-88 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983).
22. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (because "the decision to support religious
education is made by the individual, not by the State, . .. it does not seem appro-
priate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the Inland Empire School of the Bible
as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion."); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) ("Where, as here, aid to parochial schools is available only
as a result of decisions of individual parents no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be
deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion generally.")
(citation omitted) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
23. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993)
(government-paid interpreter for deaf student attending parochial high school); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (religiously oriented
film series shown in high school auditorium); Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion) (student sponsored prayer and Bible
study group meeting as extra-curricular high school activity); Witters, 474 U.S. 481
(educational disability benefits applied to help blind person obtain ministerial degree);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax deductions for certain private school ex-
penses); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student sponsored prayer and Bible
study group meeting on state university campus).
24. KURLAND, supra note 20, at 41.
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public welfare benefits otherwise generally available to all, as is
frequently argued, then under the same premise the Free Exer-
cise Clause does not require that religious individuals be unique-
ly relieved of legal burdens otherwise generally imposed upon
all.25 This general principle is familiar in other areas of consti-
tutional law and, indeed, Justice Scalia cited it in Smith.2
Liberal neutrality seems to foreclose the possibility of a
religious exemption to generally applicable laws precisely be-
cause such exemptions distort private religious choice. Just as
financial aid to religious individuals under the Establishment
Clause is constitutional only when it can be justified by secular
principles, exemptions from the unintended burdens of generally
applicable laws are constitutional only if they are not defined in
terms of religion.27 In this circumstance, conduct is protected (or
not) based upon whether it falls within the secularly defined
boundaries of the exemption, regardless of any religious motiva-
tion for the conduct. Bill Marshall was right: The Supreme Court
does not protect religion unless the religious exercise at issue fits
within the secular notion of free speech or some constitutional
25. See Ferdinand F. Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L.
REV. 546, 589 (1963); Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 618 (1964); see also KURLAND, supra note 20, at 22 ('"To
permit individuals to be excused from compliance with the law solely on the basis of
religious beliefs is to subject others to punishment for failure to subscribe to those
same beliefs."); Weiss, supra, at 623:
The task is to discern whether religion forms a variable in the statute's
formulation or application by seeing whether an assumption or decision on
a perspective of belief is called for. If so, then the statute is unconstitution-
al. If not, then religion can form neither a defense to its application nor a
justification after application for calling the statute unconstitutional.
26. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (quoting the text of the Religion and Press
Clauses of the First Amendment:
It is no more necessary to retard the collection of a general tax, for exam-
ple, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens who
believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard
the same tax as "abridging the freedom . . . of the press" of those publish-
ing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business).
27. Compare Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1990) (sales tax exemption
granted only to religious magazines violates Establishment Clause) with Walz v. Tax
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 687-89, 693 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (religious proper-
ty tax exemption does not violate Establishment Clause when comparable exemptions
are also granted to secular nonprofit organizations). See also Ira C. Lupu, Recon-
structing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 592 (1991) ("The Court tends to uphold [programs
of aid to religious organizations] only if they exhibit a breadth of coverage sufficient
to include nonreligious organizations.").
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category other than the free exercise of religion.28
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos is the exception
that proves the rule. In that case, an employee of the Mormon
church was terminated for failing to comply with certain reli-
gious standards of conduct which were unrelated to the perfor-
mance of his job.2" The employee had no action against the
church for religious discrimination because section 702 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts religious groups from anti-dis-
crimination provisions that burden religious belief and prac-
tice.30 Accordingly, the employee challenged this exemption as
an unconstitutional establishment of religion, arguing that it
amounted to government action that advanced religion.
Why are religious groups, but not other organizations in-
volved in First Amendment activities, entitled to this exemption
from anti-discrimination laws? The answer is not to be found in
the majority opinion upholding the exemption, which plods
through a thoroughly unilluminating exposition of the Lemon
test. Only Justice Brennan recognized what was truly at stake in
the challenge to the exemption-whether religion has a special
status under the Constitution. The real ground for the exemp-
tion, as Brennan made clear, is the recognition that religious
groups make unique contributions to individuals and society that
might be lost without an exemption.3' But liberal neutrality
cannot justify this position because it presupposes that the value
of the religious group lies expressly in terms of its religiosity and
community, rather than its secularity and individuality.
3 2
A test that cannot be justified by the theoretical underpin-
nings of the doctrine it purports to apply cannot look forward to
28. See Marshall, supra note 20.
29. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330, 332 (1987).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
31. 483 U.S. at 341-43. I explored this argument in detail in Frederick M.
Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 99.
32. See 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring):
For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure
from participation in a larger religious community. Such a community repre-
sents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic activity not reduc-
ible to a mere aggregation of individuals. Determining that certain activities
are in furtherance of an organization's religious mission, and that only
those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by
which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church's ability
to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious
organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.
100 [Vol. 56
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a long and vigorous life. I would, therefore, expect the same
narrow, crabbed interpretations of the compelling interest test
under RFRA as it received under the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. In
sum, the only way to justify doctrinally the special constitutional
protection of religion is with a theory which explains both why
religion is special, and why constitutional rights are held by
groups as well as individuals. Liberal neutrality supplies neither.
II.
Ironically, the failure of RFRA as law might open the possi-
bility that it would do justice. Several years ago, Jacques Derrida
delivered a lecture entitled "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Founda-
tion of Authority. '"' Among other things, Derrida examines jus-
tice in a society governed by the rule of law. How does justice
work? How does a just decision happen? Justice, Derrida says, is
an "aporetic" experience, an "experience of the impossible."3' In
philosophy, an "aporia" is what one calls an obstacle or stopping
point in the rational progression of an argument; it is a missing
logical piece that throws the conclusion of the argument into
doubt.35
Derrida argues that justice has (at least) three aporetic
qualities. First, justice exceeds the calculation of the law at the
same time that it is legitimated by law. Second, because it is
legitimated by law, justice cannot escape the originary violence
that is at the foundation of all law. Third, justice has an unpre-
dictable, overflowing character that prevents one from being
sure, at the moment of the just decision, whether justice will
really be done. I will discuss each of these in turn, illustrating
them with examples drawn from Plessy v. Ferguson,36 McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents,37 and Brown v. Board of Educa-
33. Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" (Mary Quaintance
trans.) in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell,
Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson ed. 1992) [hereinafter Derrida, Force of
Law].
34. Id. at 16.
35. See, e.g., NICOLA ABBAGNANO, DIzIONARIO DI FILOSOFIA 58 (Milan, 1990)
(defining "aporia" as "a rational doubt, that is, a difficulty inherent to an argument
and not a subjective state of uncertainty," "an objective doubt") (author's translation);
Cf JACQUES DERRIDA, APORIAS 12 (Thomas Dutoit trans. 1993) [hereinafter DERRIDA,
APORIAS] (characterizing an "aporia" as the experience of "the 'not knowing where to
go,' "the point where the very project or the problematic task becomes impossible
and where we are exposed, absolutely, without protection, without problem, and with-
out prothesis, without possible substitution").
36. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
37. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
101
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tio n." These cases are especially good for this purpose because
Brown is one of the few individual rights decisions in recent
memory that is uniformly and uncontroversially acclaimed as
just, while Plessy is one of the most infamously unjust decisions
ever rendered by the Court.3"
A.
First, Derrida argues that justice is not calculable. In contrast to
law, where a decision is guaranteed by reference to a rule,
Derrida suggests that justice is the experience of a legal problem
to which the "just" solution cannot be defended by a rule:
Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and
it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it re-
quires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experi-
ences are the experiences, as improbable as they are necessary,
of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision be-
tween just and unjust is never insured by a rule.'
We always find ourselves between these two poles, says Derrida,
between a law "which claims to exercise itself in the name of jus-
tice," and a justice that "is required to establish itself in the
name of a law that must be 'enforced.'"4 To be just, a decision
must both follow a rule, and re-invent it. "[11f the rule guaran-
tees [the decision] in no uncertain terms, so that the judge is a
calculating machine," argues Derrida,
we will not say that he is just, free and responsible. But we
also won't say it if he doesn't refer to any law, to any rule or if,
because he doesn't take any rule for granted beyond his own
interpretation, he suspends his decision, stops short before the
undecidable or if he improvises and leaves aside all rules, all
principles. 2
38. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. Other candidates would include Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
40. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 16; see also DERRIDA, APORIAS,
supra note 35, at 16 (using "aporia" for "a single duty that recurrently duplicates
itself interminably" in the form of an experience of "a responsible decision [that]
must obey an 'it is necessary' that owes nothing, it must obey a duty that owes
nothing in order to be a duty, a duty that has no debt to pay back, a duty without
debt and therefore without duty").
41. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 22.
42. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 23; see also HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 307-41 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall rev.
102 (Vol. 56
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In other words, if a decision is made without recourse to a rule,
then it is lawless and arbitrary, and by definition cannot be
called just.' Yet, if a decision is compelled by application of a
rule, there is no freedom in making the decision-it is, after all,
compelled by the rule-and thus there can be no responsibility
for its consequences." While this latter kind of decision may be
legal because it conforms to law, it cannot be called just; the lack
of responsibility and freedom on the part of the judge who ren-
ders it will prevent us from calling it just. Thus, a just decision
simultaneously applies and undermines a legal rule.
In McLaurin, the last educational segregation case decided
by the Supreme Court before it overruled Plessy in Brown, the
Court considered whether the conditions under which George
McLaurin was permitted to attend the University of Oklahoma
Law School were consistent with Plessy's "separate but equal"
rule. Specific places in class, in the library, and in the cafeteria
were set aside for students of color like McLaurin; the other
(white) students were not permitted to sit in these places.' The
state argued that the restrictions were constitutionally insignifi-
cant because the student had access to precisely the same facili-
ties as the other students, the places he was assigned to sit had
no apparent disadvantages, and he was permitted to mingle with
trans., 2d rev. ed. 1990) (arguing that it is not meaningful to discuss the existence of
a rule outside of its application to a particular problem).
43. See DERRIDA, APORIAS, supra note 35, at 17:
In order to be responsible and truly decisive, a decision should not limit it-
self to putting into operation a determinable or determining knowledge, the
consequence of some preestablished order. But, conversely, who would call a
decision that is without rule, without norm, without determinable or deter-
mined law, a decision? Who will answer for it as if for a responsible deci-
sion, and before whom? Who will dare call duty a duty that owes nothing,
or, better (or worse), that must owe nothing?
44. See Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Memories, Responses, and Respon-
sibilities in THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON TODAY'S EUROPE 4, 41, 44-45
(Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas trans. 1992); see also id. at 71:
To have at one's disposal, already in advance, the generality of a rule as a
solution to the antinomy . . . , to have it at one's disposal as a given po-
tency or science, as a knowledge and a power that would precede, in order
to settle it, the singularity of each decision, each judgment, each experience
of responsibility, to treat each of these as if they were a case-this would
be the surest, the most reassuring definition of responsibility as irresponsi-
bility, of ethics confused with juridical calculation, of a politics organized
within techno-science.
45. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640.
103
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the other students at all other times.4 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the student was "handicapped in his pursuit of effec-
tive graduate instruction" because the state had "set [him] apart
from the other students" and thereby impaired his ability "to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students and, in general, to learn his profession."
47
Now, notwithstanding all the cultural changes that have
taken place in the last two generations, it could hardly have
been much less obvious in 1950 than it is in 1994 that forcing
McLaurin to put up with racial humiliation as the price of a
state sponsored legal education was both unfair and inequitable.
But in 1950, there was no constitutional rule that permitted a
court to strike down racial restrictions on such grounds. What
the Court was stuck with, unless it wanted to overrule Plessy,
was the "separate but equal" rule which provided that a State
might separate its citizens by race so long as the segregated
facilities were substantially the same. Applying this rule, the
Court found that although Oklahoma had provided McLaurin
access to virtually the same physical facilities it provided to
white students, it had done so only on condition that McLaurin
submit to racial humiliation, thereby denying him the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Yet Plessy had never been applied so as to
protect racial humiliation simpliciter; indeed, the principal pur-
pose of the Jim Crow laws that Plessy upheld was precisely to
remind African-Americans that society considered them inferi-
or.4' Finding for McLaurin was clearly just, but to find for him
under the rule of Plessy required an application of the rule that
fatally undermined it.4" On the other hand, to have found for
46. Id. at 641.
47. Id.
48. DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND
SOUTHERN CULTURE 2-12 (1990); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 106-07 (1975):
In the South, where under slavery the races had lived in close touch and
the mastery of the white man was at all times explicit, the free black man
was now shoved farther out of the way lest physical mingling be taken as
a tacit sign of unacknowledged equality. Stripping the Negro of his civil
rights by statute and custom in a fashion sanctioned by the nation's highest
court was not enough. Jim Crow, begun on passenger trains, spread rapidly.
49. Cf Philip B. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education was the Begin-
ning--The School Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-
1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 313 (noting that McLaurin and Brown were funda-
mentally inconsistent).
[Vol. 56104
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McLaurin without reliance on Plessy, that is, without citing a
rule, would have been lawless and arbitrary, a decision without
law and therefore by definition unjust.
In fact, when just a few years later Brown explicitly declared
what had been implicit in McLaurin, ° constitutional law schol-
ars spent the better part of a generation attempting to defend
the decision with the then-existing resources of constitutional
doctrine."' Yet it is precisely Brown's break from precedent in
contrast to McLaurin's attempt to remain faithful to it-Brown's
legal incalculability against McLaurin's calculation-that makes
Brown an opinion rightly famous for having declared justice, and
McLaurin a mere doctrinal footnote.
B.
The second aporetic quality of justice identified by Derrida stems
from the inescapable connection between law and violence.
Derrida's point here is not simply that violence supplements law
or often accompanies its application; rather, it is that the very
concept of law, even law that might be called "just," implies the
application of some kind of force. This is the sense of the expres-
sion in English, "to enforce the law":
The word "enforceability" reminds us that there is no such
thing as law (droit) that doesn't imply in itself, a priori, in the
analytic structure of the concept, the possibility of being "en-
forced," applied by force. There are, to be sure, laws that are
not enforced, but there is no law without enforceability, and no
applicability or enforceability of the law without force, whether
this force be direct or indirect, physical or symbolic, exterior or
interior, brutal or subtly discursive and hermeneutic, coercive
or regulative, and so forth. 2
From here, Derrida examines the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate uses of force. "What difference is there," he asks,
"between, on the one hand, the force that can be just, or in any
50. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494, 495 (concluding that "[sleparate education
facilities are inherently unequal" because segregation "generates a feeling of inferiori-
ty as to [African-American students status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
51. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1959) (questioning the constitutional basis for
Brown); Kurland, supra note 47, at 316-17 (arguing that Brown's reasoning did not
support its result).
52. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 5-6.
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case deemed legitimate... , and on the other hand the violence
that one always deems unjust?"' The answer turns out to be,
not very much. The very rules that permit legal calculation, that
render a decision legitimate, are themselves marked by violence.
Citation of a rule in defense of a decision only defers the ques-
tion whether the decision is just to the origin of the rule, its
founding or institution. Violence is always present at the origin,
because that is where the question of justice has been resolved
by force rather than by rational persuasion.' Some kind of vio-
lence necessarily precedes the institutions that thereafter legiti-
mate laws that are enforced by violence. There is no clear differ-
ence between the legitimate violence that enforces the law, and
the illegitimate violence that is deployed without law, because
the former is ultimately traceable to the latter. Therefore, if we
try to account for justice with laws, we must always mark justice
with violence. It is almost as if justice must escape the law to
manifest itself as truly just.
Despite the obvious justice of its holding, even Brown is
marked by originary violence in this manner. Concluding that
"[sieparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," the
Supreme Court in Brown held that segregation in public educa-
tion denied racial minorities the equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 While this amend-
ment was formally adopted by two-thirds of each house of Con-
gress and ratified by three-fourths of the states, a number of
former Confederate states whose ratification was necessary to
the promulgation of the amendment did so under threat of vio-
lence.56 These states were occupied by federal troops when the
amendment was presented, and ratification was one of the pre-
conditions for removing the troops.57 Of course, the troops had
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 23-24.
55. 347 U.S. at 495.
56. Although the amendment was ratified by three-fourths of the former Union
states within a year of ratification, this was not regarded by the great majority of
Americans as sufficient to make the amendment binding as part of the Constitution.
See HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 189 (1908).
It was not until Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Tennessee each ratified the amendment, thereby giving it the
approval of three-fourths of all of the states (including those formerly part of the
Confederacy), that the amendment was declared part of the Constitution. See id. at
163-65, 190-91. Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia each ratified later. See id. at 191.
57. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 81-82, 84, 126 (1949).
Governors of a number of the former Confederate states urged ratification of the
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gotten there in the first place only because they had won the
Civil War, still the bloodiest conflict in American history. The
War itself was an action of questionable legality under the Con-
stitution, since it was at best unclear whether the federal gov-
ernment was constitutionally empowered to use force to prevent
the unilateral withdrawal of member states or to free African-
American slaves.'
C.
The last aporia of justice discussed by Derrida is linked to
its performative rather than descriptive quality. Derrida here
contrasts two categories from speech-act theory, performative
and constative statements. 59 Constatives are simply reports, de-
scriptions of the world. As such, they cannot be just, but only
precise or accurate, as in, "John and Mary were married last
night." Performatives, on the other hand, are actions. They do
something or make something happen in the world, as in "By the
authority vested in me, I now pronounce John and Mary to be
husband and wife." One of the authoritative texts in speech-act
theory, John Austin's How to Do Things with Words, evokes the
meaning of the performative."
Justice is something that is done, not something that is
reproduced or represented.61 As actions, performatives can pos-
sess or lack the quality of justice; as mere reports, constatives
amendment to speed the removal of federal troops from their borders and hasten the
return of self-government. See FLACK, supra note 56, at 194-95, 200-04. After troops
were finally removed from these states as part of the settlement of the disputed
Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, most of the rights gained by African-Americans during
the Reconstruction era were lost within a generation. See John P. Frank & Robert F.
Munro, The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH.
U. L.Q. 421.
58. For example, under the theory of federalism argued by the Southern states
prior to the war, the federal government was not an independent sovereign, and
could act only as the agent of the states pursuant to the powers delegated to it by
them, which powers could be withdrawn at will. See Earl Maltz, Reconstruction with-
out Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 24 Hous. L. REV. 221, 230-32 (1987). This theory continued to be argued even
by some Republicans in the Reconstruction Congress. Id. at 233.
59. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 26-27.
60. JoHN AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1958). See also John
Searle, How Performatives Work, 58 TENN. L. REv. 371, 372 (1991) (defining a
"performative" as "an illocutionary act that can be performed by uttering a sentence
containing an expression that names the type of speech act, as in for example, 'I
order you to leave the room').
61. Cf. Micah 6:8 (King James) ("[Wihat doth the Lord require of thee, but to
do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?").
1995]
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cannot. But it seems that we never know enough before doing
justice. "A just decision is always required immediately," Derrida
says, "right away.... 62 One can never gather in advance suffi-
cient "facts" and other knowledge to render a decision that takes
everything into account, to be sure that the performance of jus-
tice will, in fact, be just. Justice always requires a leap of faith, a
hope that the just decision will, in fact, do justice. "Paradoxical-
ly," Derrida declares,
it is because of this overflowing of the performative, because of
this always excessive haste of interpretation getting ahead of
itself, because of this structural urgency and precipitation of
justice that the latter has no horizon of expectation .... But
for this very reason, it may have an avenir, a "to-come" . ...'
Because the just decision exceeds calculation and law, it may
push, it usually will push the notion of justice "beyond the al-
ready identifiable zones of morality or politics or law . . .. 4
Because of this, Derrida calls the instant of decision, when jus-
tice must be rendered (or not), a kind of "madness."5 We must
always "wait and see" if the apparently just decision we have
made does indeed, in the end, truly perform justice.
As most legal scholars know, there are actually two Browns;
the first, decided in 1954, abandoned Plessy,6 while the second,
decided a year later, determined that the Southern states were
not required to dismantle their system of segregated schools
immediately but only "with all deliberate speed."67 In other
words, although the Court was finally willing to hold that "sepa-
rate but equal" violated the Constitution, it was unwilling to
order the South to abandon the practice "right away." The Court
knew that any order prohibiting segregation in education would
have been ignored by the South (and much of the North) unless
federal law enforcement resources were deployed to enforce it,
and the Court was concerned in 1954 (not without reason) that
the executive branch lacked the will to carry out a desegregation
order, even if issued by the Supreme Court.6 It was not until
four years after its original decision, when the Court's power to
62. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 33, at 26.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 28.
65. Id. at 26.
66. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
67. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
68. See KLUGER, supra note 48, at 752-54.
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interpret authoritatively the Constitution was directly chal-
lenged, that federal power was deployed to enforce Brown's hold-
ing. 9 Even after that, the Court continued to cite Brown spar-
ingly and with restraint. The Court finally lost its patience and
began seriously to enforce Brown in the early 1960s.70 In the
immediate aftermath of Brown, it was unclear whether the case
was to become a fatal blow against segregation, or yet another
Shelley v. Kramer71-that is, a stillborn decision that has had
no effect beyond a narrow reading of its own facts. It was only
an eventual hardening of resolve to enforce fully the original
holding of Brown by all three branches of the federal government
in the 1960s that finally resulted in the performance of some-
thing that might be called justice. Even so, today there are still
scholars willing to criticize Brown as not having significantly
advanced the cause of African-American civil rights.72
III.
And now, finally, to religious freedom and RFRA. RFRA's
compelling interest test was first adopted in free exercise doc-
trine by Sherbert v. Verner, in which the Court ordered a state to
pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist even
though she would not make herself available for work on Satur-
day (her Sabbath) as required by the state's unemployment com-
pensation law.73 The state argued that protecting the integrity
of the unemployment insurance fund against depletion by those
who "feign[ ] religious objections to Saturday work" and facilitat-
ing the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work
were sufficient reasons to deny the benefits.74 In Sherbert, how-
ever, the Supreme Court announced that government could bur-
den a fundamental right like the free exercise of religion only if
69. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
70. See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
71. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72. See, e.g., Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown
Confounded or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 109 (Derrick Bell ed. 1980) (arguing that the racial balancing or-
dered by Brown has done little to improve the education of African-American chil-
dren); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (arguing that racial change was inevitable, and that Brown
only served to stiffen Southern resistance to this change and delay its implementa-
tion).
73. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
74. Id. at 407.
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the government's action was necessary to a "compelling" regula-
tory interest that could not be protected in any less intrusive
manner.
75
The Court had never before held that governmentally im-
posed burdens on religion must be justified by more than a ratio-
nal basis. In fact, all of the decisions cited by the Court in
Sherbert in support of this holding involved either racial discrim-
ination or unjustified regulation of expression-two areas in
which the compelling interest standard had been used for many
years.76 Moreover, as I have related, just two years before
Sherbert, the Court had refused in Braunfeld to apply anything
like the compelling interest standard to burdens on the free
exercise of religion.
The Sherbert majority attempted to distinguish Braunfeld on
the ground that an exemption in that case would have complete-
ly frustrated the government's purpose in enacting Sunday clos-
ing laws.77 Even conceding this factual premise, the argument
is unpersuasive. If an individual suffers a constitutionally signif-
icant deprivation of liberty when forced to choose between tem-
porary economic benefits and faithfulness to religious conscience,
as Sherbert held, then surely the deprivation of liberty is even
greater when the cost of faithfulness is loss of a lifetime of finan-
cial and human capital invested in a small business," as the
plaintiff claimed in Braunfeld.79 If one balances the state's in-
terest against the individual's deprivation of liberty, it would
seem that even a substantial undermining of the state's interest
in providing for a uniform day of rest and relaxation does not
seem to outweigh the Braunfeld plaintiffs loss of his business.
Braunfeld was a straightforward application of the belief-
action doctrine originally announced by the Court in Reynolds v.
United States, in which the Court refused to find a constitution-
ally compelled exemption from anti-bigamy laws for Mormon
polygamists."0 The Court determined that, while "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion" by the Free
Exercise Clause, it was "left free to reach actions which were in
75. Id. at 403, 406-07.
76. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
77. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
78. See Galanter, supra note 15, at 279; Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development-Part I: The Religious Liberty Guar-
antee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1401 (1967).
79. See 366 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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violation of social duties or subversive of good order.""l The
Court reasoned that, because laws are enacted precisely to regu-
late actions, it would be anomalous to excuse illegal actions sim-
ply because they were religiously motivated. s2
The distinction between belief and action had controlled the
disposition of free exercise claims through the remainder of the
nineteenth and into the twentieth century, ensuring that such
claims remained almost completely ineffective in securing relief
for individuals who found exercise of their religious beliefs bur-
dened by general laws. When the Supreme Court renewed its
interest in the religion clauses in the 1940s, it reaffirmed the
distinction. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, which applied the Free
Exercise Clause to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court interpreted the constitu-
tionally protected freedom of religion to encompass both freedom
of belief and freedom of action.' However, while the Court
found religiously motivated belief to be absolutely protected, it
held that religiously motivated conduct, "in the nature of things,"
was "subject to regulation for the protection of society."" Under
the belief-action doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause deprived gov-
ernment of any authority to punish a person for his or her reli-
gious beliefs, but did not affect the authority of government to
regulate religiously motivated actions so long as there existed a
public interest rationale for the regulation. Since the government
can always meet this light burden of justification, the belief-
action doctrine effectively foreclosed the possibility of constitu-
tionally compelled free exercise exemptions.'
Sherbert clearly did justice by granting to Sabbatarians and
other nonSunday worshippers the same unemployment benefits
that are available to Christians by virtue of their majority sta-
tus. It is equally clear, however, that the Court's decision in
Sherbert was not defensible by reference to any rule that was
previously in force regarding the free exercise of religion.
Sherbert is simply not persuasive as a calculation of precedent.
Although the Court purported to rest its decision on the belief-
action doctrine of Reynolds and Braunfeld, its extension of the
compelling interest doctrine to burdens on religious exercise
effectively eliminated the belief-action doctrine as a rule of con-
81. Id. at 164.
82. Id. at 166.
83. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
84. Id. at 303-04.
85. See Galanter, supra note 15, at 235.
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stitutional decision. The justice of this decision required a simul-
taneous application and undermining of the rule the Court ap-
plied.
The originary violence mentioned by Derrida marks Sherbert
as well. The First Amendment followed the Revolutionary War
and was drafted pursuant to an amendment process, provided by
a constitutional convention, that exceeded its original mandate of
refining the Articles of Confederation.' One can also mention
the very narrow popular base of support for the Free Exercise
Clause in both the Congress that enacted the First Amendment
and the state legislatures that ratified it-no women nor any
Native Americans, African-Americans, or other racial minorities
served in these bodies, and hardly any religious minorities were
present; rather, these bodies were composed almost exclusively of
propertied, white, Protestant males. And the Court cites the
Fourteenth Amendment, whose violence I have already dis-
cussed, as the basis for applying the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of free exercise to the states. 7
Perhaps most interesting is that the language of the Sher-
bert test has violence inscribed in its very text. The test states
that a "compelling state interest" that cannot be affected by any
"less restrictive means" justifies an infringement of a religious
claimant's right to exercise his religion. Think a moment about
what this means. It seems to impose a higher burden of justifica-
tion on the government, yet this burden is illusory. Can there be
any doubt that if the compelling state interest test had been
deployed against the Mormons in the nineteenth century, a com-
pelling state interest in preserving monogamous marriage would
have been articulated to justify the persecution of the Mormons
that actually occurred? Is it an accident that under this test
most religious claimants that have come before the Supreme
Court (and virtually every religious minority) have been denied
relief under the Free Exercise Clause?' It is true that the gov-
86. CATHERINE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 4, 226, 311-12 (1986).
87. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
88. No Muslim, Jewish, or Native American plaintiff has ever prevailed on a
free exercise claim before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that Free Exercise Clause
does not prevent federal government from implementing land use plan for govern-
ment land that would destroy Native American religion); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying Muslim prison inmates exemption from policy
which prevented them from attending worship services); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986) (holding that Free Exercise Clause does not prevent government from assign-
ing social security number to Native American child in violation of parent's religious
112 [Vol. 56
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ernment sometimes lost under the compelling interest test,
whereas it never lost under the belief-action doctrine, but this is
only a difference in the amount of violence inflicted on religious
believers, and not a distinction between violence and the lack
thereof.
That brings me to the avenir, the "to-come," of the Sherbert-
Yoder test (and, for a time, it did have a future as constitutional
doctrine). When Sherbert was decided in 1963, the courts in the
United States had at least a century-long tradition of refusing to
relieve believers from the burdens of generally applicable laws so
long as the laws had a rational basis. To hold that government
could burden a religious belief only in pursuit of a compelling
interest, as Sherbert did, was a clear break from tradition. The
break became even more dramatic when, not quite ten years
after Sherbert, the Court held in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the
Free Exercise Clause required government to provide a compel-
ling justification for any refusal to grant believers exemptions
from the law. The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine provided both that a
law which burdens the free exercise of religion and a state's
refusal to exempt religious objectors from complying with this
law must be justified by a compelling interest.
The compelling interest test is an undeniably strict standard
beliefs); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying orthodox Jewish ser-
viceman exemption from uniform regulation which prevented his wearing a yarmul-
ke); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (denying orthodox Jewish merchant ex-
emption from Sunday closing law that threatened economic viability of his business).
Fundamentalist Christians and sects outside of so-called "mainline Protestantism"
have had only mixed success in seeking exemptions. Compare Unemployment Com-
pensation Cases, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); 480 U.S. 136 (1987); 450 U.S. 707 (1981); 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (reversing denials of unemployment benefits to nondenominational
Christian, Seventh Day Adventist, and Jehovah's Witness who lost or left employ-
ment for reasons of religious conscience) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(Amish parents cannot be prosecuted for violation of compulsory school attendance
statute) with Swaggart v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (denying televi-
sion ministry exemption from general tax on sales of Bibles); Jensen v. Quaring, 472
U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam), aftg by an equally divided Court 728 F.2d 1121 (1984)
(denying exemption from driver's license photograph requirement to person who be-
lieved photographs were "graven images" in violation of the Ten Commandments);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (denying
religious foundation exemption from federal labor regulations); Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying Christian university exemption from
regulation which denies tax exemption to racially discriminatory educational insti-
tutions); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying Amish employer exemp-
tion from Social Security taxes); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
(denying Jehovah's Witnesses exemption from public school requirement of saluting
the flag), overruled by Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (denying polygamous Mormon exemp-
tion from prosecution under anti-bigamy laws).
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of review in any context, but it is especially so in free exercise
analysis. In deciding in particular cases whether the religious
claimant truly holds beliefs which conflict with government ac-
tion, the Court has always privileged the claimant's interpreta-
tion of what his or her beliefs demand over alternative evidentia-
ry sources. 9 In Thomas v. Review Board," for example, the
Court held that unemployment benefits could not be denied a
religious pacifist who quit his job rather than accept a transfer
to an armaments factory. 1 In reaching this decision, the Court
refused to credit either arguments that the pacifist was incon-
sistent in the application of his anti-war principles, or the fact
that another member of the same religion worked in the factory
and found no conflict between his work and his faith.' In a
later case, Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Securi-
ty,93 the Court found it irrelevant that the religious claimant be-
longed to no church or organized religious body.' Both holdings
are consistent with language in an older case, United States v.
Ballard,95 in which the Court foreclosed judicial inquiry into the
truth or falsity of religious beliefs."
When combined with the Court's deference to the claimant's
understanding of what his or her religion requires, the extraor-
dinary protection of religious exercise at least formally granted
by the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine created a potentially serious law
enforcement dilemma: a broad constitutional exemption from
compliance with any law which seemed to be available merely
for the asking to any person who represented himself as a reli-
gious objector.97 While the sincerity with which an objector ad-
89. Galanter, supra note 15, at 267-68. But see Gianella, supra note 78, at
1419.
90. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
91. Id. at 716-20.
92. See id. at 715 ("Thomas' statements reveal no more than that he found
work in the roll foundry sufficiently insulated from producing weapons of war. We
see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he
drew was an unreasonable one."); id. at 716 ("[I]t is not within the judicial function
and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.").
93. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
94. Id. at 832-33.
95. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
96. See id. at 87 (although the religious beliefs of respondents "might seem in-
credible, if not preposterous, to most people," the truth or falsity of such beliefs may
not constitutionally be made an issue in a criminal trial).
97. William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 359 (1989-90); see also Galanter,
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hered to a belief or tenet formally remained a legitimate inquiry,
the Court's hostility towards the investigation of the reasonable-
ness of a claimant's religious beliefs, together with its willing-
ness to credit the claimant's own interpretation of the behavioral
requirements of those beliefs, made any inquiry into sincerity
problematic. As Stephen Pepper asked some years ago, could the
compelling interest test possibly mean so much?"
As it happened, the answer was no. The broad mandate of
free exercise exemptions that seemed to follow from the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine did not pose a serious difficulty when
the benefit to be gained from exemption was something few peo-
ple would actually want, like receipt of unemployment benefits
despite being unavailable for work on one's Sabbath, or freedom
from prosecution under compulsory school attendance laws." As
the Court sardonically observed in Frazee v. Illinois Department
of Employment Security Department,"°° granting benefits to a
Christian who refused to accept Sunday work was unlikely to
lead to a mass labor movement opposing Sunday employ-
ment,10' and it was equally unlikely that teenagers (or their
parents) would be motivated to relocate to Amish communities
and go to work on the farm in order to avoid attending high
school. In United States v. Lee,' °2 however, the Amish asked
the Court to grant them a free exercise exemption from paying
social security taxes. Perhaps fearing a tidal wave of exemption
requests by people claiming that their religious beliefs prevented
them from paying any kind of tax at all, the Court found the
government's interest in denying the Amish an exemption to be
compelling."3
Lee marked the beginning of the end of the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine. In quick succession, the Court denied free exercise
relief to an orthodox Jew who sought to wear a yarmulke in
violation of Air Force uniform regulations in Goldman v.
supra note 15, at 270 ("[When this forbearance toward religious objection is com-
bined with the new permissiveness in defining religion, other kinds of possibilities
come into view. Dissidents of all kinds-nudists, LSD users, racists, utopians, and
groups as yet unimagined-can be expected to present claims for religious freedom.").
98. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 299, 300.
99. See id. at 326; cf Fernandez, supra note 25, at 547 (the definition of re-
ligion is not important when an individual receives little benefit from asserting that
his motives are religious).
100. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
101. Id. at 835.
102. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
103. Id. at 260.
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Weinberger; ° to a Native American tribe which sought to pre-
vent construction of a highway that would prevent its members
from worshipping in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Association; °5 and to a televangelist who objected to state
taxation of Bible sales in Swaggart Ministeries v. Board of
Equalization of California. °8 Surveying these decisions, Mark
Tushnet concluded that the Court was willing to protect religious
exercise only when doing so either was relatively inexpensive or
was otherwise consistent with secular constitutional norms like
freedom of expression or due process of law.' 7 Smith merely
confirmed what should have been obvious for some time-that
despite its holdings in Sherbert and Yoder, the Court had virtu-
ally no commitment to special protection of the free exercise
rights of religious minorities. Lacking the resolve it showed in
eventually enforcing Brown, the Court never allowed the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine to grow into a performance of justice;
rather, the doctrine became, almost immediately, another Shelley
v. Kramer.
IV.
Now we have RFRA, an attempt of questionable constitu-
tionality to reinstate a doctrine that historically has been of
questionable utility. Leaving aside the question of constitutional-
ity, one can still ask, if the Court had little commitment to pro-
tecting the free exercise rights of religious minorities before,
what has changed? Is there any reason to think that a Court
that failed to apply Sherbert and Yoder in a meaningful way will
apply RFRA in a more meaningful way?
Perhaps there is, and the reason is RFRA itself. Several
years ago, Laurence Tribe wrote an essay provocatively entitled,
The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics.0 8 Tribe's point was that Supreme Court
decisions are not neutral interventions in a static world; rather,
Supreme Court decisions shape the very world they adjudicate,
twisting and bending it in a way not unlike the way the gravita-
tional pull of large masses distorts space-time. One of the best
104. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
105. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
106. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
107. See Mark V. Tushnet, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249 (1988).
108. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1989).
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examples Tribe related was that of Brown itself, which he de-
scribes as simultaneously failure and success:
By 1964, less than two percent of southern schools were deseg-
regated. The direct force of the law had been almost a total
failure. Yet Brown v. Board of Education's mere declaration of
rights profoundly affected the political dialogue in America.
One reason was that this declaration of rights had itself dra-
matically altered the country's perspective as to which group
had law and order on its side. During the Montgomery bus
boycotts and throughout the civil rights movement, Brown put
the force of legal morality behind the demonstrators. And, be-
cause most Americans believe in law and respect individual
rights, the then unavoidable perception of a right-remedy gap
fueled the political dialogue-with Martin Luther King using
Brown to help propel the passage of major civil rights legis-
lation."°
As law, Brown seems to have been a failure. But as rhetoric, it
was a blinding success. By declaring segregated public education
unconstitutional in Brown, the Court did not describe the world,
it re-made it; it did not report justice, it performed it. As Tribe
suggests, without Brown, most of the political and legislative
action that has made a real difference in the lives of African-
Americans and other minorities would not have taken place.
The enactment of RFRA was an extraordinary event. It
represents perhaps the broadest political coalition ever assem-
bled in support of any individual rights initiative and was passed
by overwhelming margins in both houses of Congress.1 In ef-
fect, the President of the United States, the Congress, and most
interest groups have told the Court that its doctrine is seriously
flawed. No formal constitutional apparatus can require the Court
to listen to what the country told it by enacting RFRA, but hav-
ing been sent, the message may be hard to ignore. Because of
RFRA, the constitutional space in which the Court operates has
been altered, and will remain altered, whether RFRA survives
constitutional challenge or not. As a result, there may be reason
to hope that the Supreme Court will yet fulfill its constitutional
responsibility of protecting the religious liberty of all of
America's people.
109. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
110. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1995).
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